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TRINITY COLLEGE, CAMBRIDGE.
IN a previous article I endeavoured to show that
the problem of suffering or of physical evil does
not present insuperable difficulties to Christian or
theistic belief, because in our developing world all
things, which hang together as one whole, work
together for good, i.e. for the establishing and
perfecting of man’s moral status ; and that the
actuality of physical evil is a logically necessary
concomitant of an ordered evolutionary world.
And in passing now to the further problem of
moral evil, a similar mode of argument will be
followed. But whereas in dealing with physical
evil our main presupposition was the necessity of
nature’s uniformity, when we come to reckon with ’~
the existence of moral evil our chief presupposition II
is the necessity, for a moral order, of human ’,
freedom.
It was remarked that indictments of the world I
as productive of pain always proceeded from the
hedonistic standpoint, and otherwise could have
no point; and we have now to observe that in so far
as those indictments are dictated by concern for
the moral evil of the world, they proceed from a
similar fallacious assumption, namely, that the best
possible world would be one in which there was no
room for freedom and the choice of moral evil.
Both kinds of objection overlook the fact that the
best world must be a moral order, not a paradise
of unalloyed animal contentment. And if uni-
formity, with its involved productiveness of
suffering, be a sine qua non for any theatre of
intelligent life, so now it must be emphasized that
freedom, and therefore the possibility of moral
evil, is a siore rlua iioii for a real~~ of inorality. For
this, strange to say, is often overlooked. Huxley,
for instance, tells us ( Cvlleeled ~ssca~~.r, i. i ~ ~ ) that
if a higher Power would undertake to make him
always do right on condition of ’being turned into
a sort of clocl:,’ he would close with the offer; the
only freedom he cared about was the freedom to
do right, while freedom to do wrong he would
gladly part with on the cheapest terms. But of
course the ‘freedom’ of a clock is rigid necessity,
and has no connexion with morality. Similarly
Dr. McTaggart (Some Dogmas of Religion, p. i 65 )
remarks : If God had to choose between making
our wills undetermined and making them good, I
should have thought He would have done well to
make them good.’ But, again, such ‘goodness’
has nothing to do with morality, unless the correct
time-keeping of a ’good’ clock, such as Huxley
would have liked to resemble, be moral conduct.
ivithout needing to attempt a definition of freedom,
we can distinguish between the behaviour of an
automaton or a puppet, even if sentient, and a
man who pursues ends of his own ; and it is to
beings of thc latter class alone that we apply the
category moral.’
The best possible world, we have said, must be
a moral order because moral character is the best
finite thing that we can conceive ; and we now see
that morality implies self-determination or freedom.
Without the possibility of choice between incen
tives to actions of different moral worth, without
opportunity to choose evil in the presence of a
possible alternative choice of good, moral conduct
is precluded. The really good world, then, as
distinguished from the merely pleasant, implies the
existence of moral agents with their freedom to
sin ; the crown of creation cannot be the puppet
or the automaton. A world from which all possi-
bility of sin were excluded, would not be a moral
order at all. The crown of creation must be a
creator as well as a creature. So God stands ‘a
hand-breadth off,’ as it were, to give His creature
scope to grow and act; and again the Divine
motive is love. We are made fellow-workers’
together with God in the realization of His purpose.
For the actual evil introduced into the world,
man’s will and not God’s will is directly respons-
ible. Nlaii’s sin is not God’s act. No doubt
God’s foresight contemplated the possibility of
human sin, and He is responsible for that possi-
bility. But He is not the author of our moral
evil; conceivably there might have been none. But
even if, as some would argue, He, as the cause of
us who cause evil, is its ultimate cause, we need
not be perturbed ; because the highest good which
He directly wills could not be had without per-
mitting such evil as is necessarily incidental to its
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attainment. The freedom which is the condition
of ’ the glorious liberty of the children of God ’ is
at the same time man’s burden because of its I
outcome ; but we cannot have the one aspect
without the other, any, more than, as we saw when
discussing pain, we can have reason without tears.
There is neither too much necessity in nature nor
too much freedom in humanity to allow of the
world being good ; all there is of each is essential
to the world’s moral value.
But if the possibility and even the actuality of
moral evil be thus no disproof of the goodness of
God, but rather evinces the fact that God at all
costs seeks our highest good, it has also been
objected that it is incompatible with His almighti-
ness. We shall have an opportunity later to
discuss the meaning of omnipotence as an attribute
of God ; but in the present connexion we may
consider it in so far as is necessary to deal with the I
common suggestion that an omnipotent God could
at least intervene to protect us from the severer
forms of temptation and so prevent our most
miserable and hurtful acts of sin. Such promiscu-
ous resort to miracle would not only convert the
. 
order of the world into an unintelligible chaos ; it
would also destroy the very freedom which is the
essence of a moral order. Appeals of this kind to &dquo;
omnipotence are really demands for Divine self-
contradictoriness. Were we safeguarded at every
turn so as to be immune from temptation to do
wrong, objective rightness or correctness of
behaviour might certainly be ensured; but only at
the cost of all moral worth. It is not so that we
can acquire moral strength or moral character.
For character is made, not born ; and any coercion
or confining of the moral agent is so far to exclude
him from the conditions that alone make for
moral betterment. Doubtless such promiscuous
intervention in human affairs as we have been
considering would spare mankind much misery,
and God is not to be conceived as indifferent to
human suffering. Nay, we must believe that in so
far as He can do so without cancelling the very
conditions of the realization of His world-purpose,
the moral order as a whole, God works to overcome
the moral evil of mankind. But any sparing of
men the consequences of their wickedness, or even
preventing that wickedness by the suppression of
their temptations, would mean surrender of the ideal
which the world embodies and the purpose towards
which it tends. When morality and freedom
from unhappiness conflict, as often they necessarily
must, morality must be achieved at the expense of
happiness, and not z~r’ce versa. A world in leading-
strings, as one of our philosophers has remarked,
may realize an ideal, but can have no ideal that is
truly its own, no moral ideal.
But, for us, the moral ideal which is at the same
time our own and God’s for us, expresses the very
nature of God ; and if the ideal be good, the
conditions on which alone it can be realized must
also be instrumentally good. So much our intelli-
gence tells us ; and our hearts acquiesce. Con-
fronted with the choice between the innocent and
contented life of the brutes, on the one hand, and
the life of a being who Catl look before and after,’
the life of moral endeavour and advance through
failures towards perfection, on the other hand, men
certainly rejoice that the dignity of the moral
status is their prerogative. Even the wicked
recognize the supremacy of moral ideals, while the
good condemn any kind of life that is incapable of
satisfying the soul’s nobler needs as unworthy of
them even as they now are. IVe accept ‘ the
chance of the prize of learning love,’ and recognize
that the attainment of character is worth the cost.
At least we do so if allowed to entertain the belief
that moral evil, while not superfluous to a moral
realm while in the making, is not supreme, or
necessarily destined to become supreme.
As to the latter of these conditions something
now needs to be said. If moral evil were known
to us to be ultimately insuperable, to be purely and
absolutely evil in that it ministered to nothing but
further evil and was never subservient to the
~! good ; then, though the world might be a moral
order, it would be a mockery of man’s aspirations
rather than a good world. Hence the theist is
required to do more than prove, as we have so
far striven to prove, that the possibility of moral
evil is a logical necessity and its actuality is due
to man’s freedom; he must further be able to
’ 
meet the objection that human freedom and the
i divine self-consistency to which we have appealed
as against arbitrary ’omnipotence,’ imply that
possibly sin may abound more and more, or that
human freedom be destined for ever to thwart
God’s purpose.
Looked at in the abstract, freedom and con-
tingency, as contrasted with coercion and necessity,
certainly imply the theoretical possibility that the
good will never be realized. But a naked possi-
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bility, as Leibniz said, is nothing. As a matter of
fact, the history of free hurnanity has so far been a
history, on the whole, of moral progress. Truly
we are not entitled to generalize from this fragment
of the race’s experience to the indefinitely long
future. But there are certain qualities intrinsic to
goodness and evil respectively which afford ground
for reasonable belief that in the long-run evil is
self-destructive and that therefore the world will
.continually improve. Continually, but not neces-
sarily continuously. There have been, and doubt-
Jess will be, grave set-backs such as that which
-drove the world aghast a few years ago, when the
,profoundest immorality disclosed itself as having
possessed one of the most civilized nations of
mankind. The faith of Christians in the coming
of the kingdom of Heaven on earth was disturbed ;
and men found it hard to acquiesce in the so slow
grinding of the mills of God. But if we con-
template long vistas of time we can hope that
progress will maintain itself and perhaps proceed
in future ages with increased speed; for the gains
of self conserving moral goodness over unstable
and self-disrupting wickedness would seem to be
cumulative. We need not appeal therefore to
God’s power to subdue all things to Himself, even
if we interpret that power in terms of love or
fuller self-revelation ; though doubtless this may be
taken into account in establishing our hope that
wil is not destined to become supreme. And if
this hope be trustworthy, the existence of moral
evil in a developing moral order would not seem,
any more than the existence of physical evil, to
present an insuperable obstacle to religious faith. -
Contributions and Comments.
two @J-ot<6 Oil f~e (4cfa of f~e .
~po£)tfe.6.
A. iii. 16.-Professor ’t’orrey’s recent study on the
Co!ll~C)S!tl(IIZ and ~lll~ vf Ads (y6) has much in
it that is helpful towards the restoration of the
Aramaic background to Ac i to i5. There are as
well in it other points which will raise almost the
5ame degree of criticism as that which should be
raised over his view of the Codex Bezae (p. 40. i).
Such a point is in his interpretation of Ac 3IG.
The question raised concerns the repeated phrase
in that verse, his name’: ~;ai È7rt. T7 7rLcrHL To0
Ol~Of.(,CCTOS aÛTov TOUTOV UV BE(DPE6TE Kat. U6OQTE ÈerTfp-
~(1)(J-EP TO OVO~,I,Q, aurou «T/B..&horbar;/.<?. ‘and by faith in his
name to this man whom ye see and know his
name hath given strength.’ Recent textual critics,
like Preuschen, want to excise the second occur-
rence of the phrase ; recent translators, like Moffatt,
drop it ; and recent Aramaists, like Torrey, offer
an Aramaic original which smooths away the
possibility of what he calls ‘an outcropping bit of
popular superstition.’ His Aramaic turns into
English as : And by faith in his name he hath
made strong this one whom ye see and know.’
But is there need to deny the second phrase?
And if it is denied, is it not done in the interest of
modern sensitiveness rather than in the interest of
early simplicity ? P It is to be recalled that so early
a writer as Irenaeus would have preserved the
second occurrence of the phrase. In his valuable
little treatise the Demonstratioll of .Apostolical
Preaching, 96-97, is the following passage : &dquo;17he
(name) is that of God, that is of Jesus Christ, the
Son of God, which the demons themselves obey,
as well as evil spirits and all inimical forces, by the
invocation of the name of Jesus Christ, crucified
under Pontius Pilate.’ This statement of the
Bishop of Lyons comes after his citation of Jl 2:J~
and Ac 4 12. Again, Justin Martyr, who is another
inheritor of first-century exegesis, says in «4/u/, ii. vi,
6 : ’We Christians adjure them (the demoniacs)
in the name of Jesus Christ, crucified under
Pontius Pilate.’ It is not Folklore that is in the
Acts or in the second-century writers. Nor is the
problem here of this sort that a pristine declaration
in the terms of Faith has become stained with
second-century Magic. If in these late days the
meanings of Jesus Christ have not yet been found,
it ought not to be a matter for surprise that the
1 Barthoulot, the Armenian scholar who has died recently,
was the first to point out that the close of c. 96 and the opening
sentence of c. 97 were to be joined together if sense was to
be made of Iren&oelig;us’s statements, see D&eacute;monstra iond
la Pr&eacute;dication Apostolique, 1917, 427. 5. In this place also
Professor Tixeront draws attention to the same Justin
passage that is used above.
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